Authors: Lahiru Jayathilake, Yasith Jayawardana, and Dimuthu Wannipurage (Georgia Institute of Technology); Jim Basney (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign); and Suresh Marru (Georgia Institute of Technology)
Abstract: High performance computing systems rely on a direct user-access model: users authenticate at the access boundary and operate within Unix accounts. This model supports strong attribution and bounded privilege but does not address the growing role of software that accesses clusters on behalf of users. Science gateways, workflow systems, and remote development tools initiate SSH-mediated actions without per-connection user involvement. Existing delegation mechanisms such as shared credentials and long-lived keys weaken auditability and complicate enforcement. This paper treats delegated cluster access as an access-control problem at the HPC access boundary. We present a policy-constrained signer that validates the user's identity, maps requests to site-defined Unix principals, and issues short-lived SSH certificates scoped by policy. Standard OpenSSH login nodes enforce these certificates with no additional software. We evaluate the signer on a Jetstream2 SLURM testbed across issuance overhead, enforcement, revocation, and auditability. We separately evaluate certificate-based workflow resilience under connection drops.
Presentation: file