Research and ACM SRC Posters Archive

The Unassessed Attack Surface: Channel-Based Provenance in HPC and Quantum-Computing Open-Source Software


Poster Type: Research Posters

Author: Pengyin Shan (National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract: Software trust is negotiated in communication channels such as the README, the registry listing, or the maintainer's account. AI agents now consume these channels directly, and attackers enter through them: the XZ Utils backdoor arrived through a mailing list, the Shai-Hulud worms phished maintainers to compromise 1,000+ npm packages, and in 2026, AI agents repeatedly installed a hallucinated package that never existed. Existing tools assess repositories, builds, and artifacts, but not this layer. We present channel-based provenance, to our knowledge, the first assessment framework for this layer: 18 signals spanning identity and access, communication channels, knowledge infrastructure, and distribution metadata, measured on 87 HPC and quantum-computing projects with a hand-verified 30-project panel. We find near-total provenance blindness; no missing signal requires new infrastructure, so the gap is adoption. The poster walks viewers from attack timeline to framework to per-project results, closing with concrete calls for maintainers, software stacks, and facilities.

Best Poster Finalist (BP): no
Poster: PDF
Poster Summary: PDF


Back to Poster Archive Listing